The 3D approach and counterinsurgency

A mix of defence, diplomacy and development

The case of Uruzgan

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Social/Academic relevance of the study

Comprehensive approach, 3D-approach, three block warfare; old theories in new terms?

Counterinsurgency, COIN recipes?,

Human factor, Local population, insurgents = terrorists?

What does it mean for modern military operations and how is it/should it be done?
Main Research Question

How effective is the 3D approach in the fight against the insurgents in Afghanistan?
Set up Research

a. comprehensive literature overview about insurgency and counterinsurgency;
b. analysis of the 3D-concept;
c. single case - study of 3D concept in Uruzgan (PRT 1 – 6)
COIN (I)

“Counter-insurgency campaigns are won not by body counts, but by the absence of killing and satisfying citizens' hopes” (Greg Mills Special Advisor to ISAF IX)

Critical variable in COIN: the local population
COIN (II)

Most famous COIN theories (RAND):

Hearts and Mind (HAM)
Carrot and Stick

No major theories have been developed ever since.
Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate the never-ending difficulties of fighting insurgencies despite the so-called lessons learned of the past.

Statistically, the factor most critical to COIN success is able and accountable government; the ability of local government to deliver public service is a better indicator of military effectiveness than eliminating insurgents.
Nature of insurgencies dictates that institutional change cannot keep pace with the threat; the side that learns faster and adapts faster usually wins. ‘learning competitions’

The fact that major Western military organisations are not able to learn an adapt as fast as insurgents such as the Taliban creates a major disadvantage in counter insurgency operations.
Main factors of importance in the conflict in Uruzgan:

1. a long history of tribal conflict, conquest and expulsion;
2. a lack of good governance in the province for almost a century;
3. the presence of anti-government elements or ‘spoilers’ from within and outside the province (De Boer, 2008)
3D concept
*Defense, Diplomacy and Development*

HAM theory seems to be the theoretical background of the 3D concept.

3D is also known as comprehensive approach or the whole of government approach.

These terms are commonly used to describe an integrated approach towards (post) conflict states or so-called fragile states by organisations such as NATO, OECD and the UN and various nations.
Dutch 3D concept (I)
The trinity of politics, security and development

Foundations for the Dutch concept were laid in the 80ties by former minister of Development Aid Pronk (integrated foreign policy and cooperation between defense and development)

A central theme in the Dutch Strategy is ‘Afghanisation’: working methods need to be adjusted to the Afghan context even though it might affect the speed of the development.
Dutch 3D concept (II)

Ink blot strategy: pacifying a given area establishes its presence in a location where the population is most supportive of its efforts, or where an area of key strategic importance can be secured.

Implementing tools of the 3D concept: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (COIN theory and PRTs)
3D and COIN

The main aim in counterinsurgency and the 3D concept is to foster a development that will create a local host nation administrative capacity, capable of providing security and basic needs and services in a manner which is perceived as legitimate by the local population.
3D criticism

An important critique raised against the 3D concept, is the fact that it is a Western model. It could therefore be argued that the concept would lack legitimacy and thereby acceptance of the local population since it is introduced by foreign troops.
Set up Case Study (I)

How to measure the effectiveness of the 3D concept? Effectiveness was defined as improvement of the stability in Uruzgan.

Stability was defined as a situation where in the state:

a. upholds the rule of law, uses its public sector for equal distribution of (social) service delivery to its citizens, and is therefore ultimately perceived as legitimate [governance];
Set up Case Study (II)

b. holds the monopoly on violence, using democratically controlled security forces that are able to guarantee the security of its citizens throughout its territory and are capable of holding off threats from external actors [security];

c. economic development, natural resource management, and basic social services (healthcare, education, etc.) are provided for [socioeconomic development] (Stability Assessment Framework, 2005)
Set up Case Study (III)

In order to collect all data needed to measure the effectiveness, interviews were held with all the PRT commanders (from rotation 1 until 6), development advisors, political advisors, NGOs. The same people filled in questionnaires about the situation with regard to governance, security and development.

Furthermore, all bimonthly parliamentary reports of the mission were analysed and used for the trend assessment.
Major findings of the case study (I)

1. Some progress is made with regard to the stability in Uruzgan albeit unbalanced and fragile

2. Increase of the legitimacy of the state can be observed since PRT3 which has remained constant since then. It is assessed that the activities in the province which are presented with an ‘Afghan face’ have contributed to this trend.

3. The effectiveness and legitimacy of the provincial government have remained low.
Major findings of the case study (II)

4. The civil service scored consistently low on effectiveness and legitimacy and no improving trend is indicated.

5. The delivery of public services has shown an increasing trend since the last two rotations, but this is most likely connected to the increase of NGO activities in the area since the local government is still not able to independently provide these services to its people.
Major findings of the case study (III)

6. After a long negative score (four rotations) the leadership has shown a small increase. The governor seems to win terrain and seems to be able – assisted by the PRT – to reach out to the various tribes.

As a result the tribe related group hostilities have decreased and that trend has remained constant during the last two rotations. Also the reconciliation program which is promoted by the governor seems to gain terrain.
Major findings of the case study (IV)

7. The three most positive trends are observed for the security apparatus and the economic opportunities and growth.

Especially the trend with regard to the security apparatus has steadily increased since the beginning of the mission and it is assessed to keep growing. The increasing trend is mainly ascribed to the Afghan army; both their effectiveness and legitimacy are reported to be high. An impressive score that no other institution in Uruzgan has received or is likely to receive any time soon.
Major findings of the case study (V)

8. The performance of the police force is poor. Their scores are – like the civil service – low but the last two rotations have indicated that they are improving. However, both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the police are still perceived to be poor.

9. The regional setting of Uruzgan - which is connected to the influence of Pakistan - on the stability in the region has remained the same during all six rotations. It was assessed that the Pakistani intelligence service remained to support the insurgents in the region but clear indicators could not be established in the field.
10. The most consistent trend - with no improvements at all - is viewed in the area of rule of law and human rights. It has received the lowest score and has not increased even slightly during either rotation.

It is assessed that the existence of the informal legal system - the Pashtunwali - remains to be more influential. The concept of human rights is new to a province such as Uruzgan and will most likely not take root any time soon.
Summarising, the data collected in the case studies points to a slow but progressing improvement of the stability in Uruzgan.

It is however alarming that both the local government, its civil service and the police have not yet made any progress. They are important players for sustainable stability in the province and are identified as crucial variables for successful counterinsurgency in best practices COIN studies.
Limitation

An important limitation to the success of the 3D concept in Uruzgan seems to be the capacity and willingness of both the national and local government to launch national development programs and enforce the needed reforms in the various institutions such as the police and the civil service.
The recent successes of the Dutch in the Baluchi Valley (operation Tura Gahr) has shown that the popular support can be won by demonstrating progress in the development zones. However, the sustainability of the stability is a major problem.

As underlined by one of the PRT commanders: “the 3D concept is the best we have got but it can be improved since it lacks a strategic vision about the goals which should be achieved in Uruzgan. As a result we improvise and experiment which has led to relatively positive results, but does however not contribute to the sustainability of our success “.
The fact that the defence component of the 3D approach has achieved better results than the diplomacy/governance component might be a result of the prioritisation of the missions conducted by the Taskforce.
Questions?

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